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https://github.com/hashcat/hashcat
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HCCAPX management: Use advanced hints in message_pair stored by hcxtools about endian bitness of replay counter
Fixed missing code section in -m 2500 and -m 2501 to crack corrupted handshakes with a LE endian bitness base
This commit is contained in:
jsteube
parent
5035b75bd7
commit
547025ec47
@ -1207,6 +1207,8 @@ typedef struct wpa
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u32 hash[4];
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int nonce_compare;
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int nonce_error_corrections;
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int detected_le;
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int detected_be;
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} wpa_t;
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496
OpenCL/m02500.cl
496
OpenCL/m02500.cl
@ -321,6 +321,160 @@ __kernel void m02500_aux1 (__global pw_t *pws, __global const kernel_rule_t *rul
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const u32 nonce_error_corrections = wpa->nonce_error_corrections;
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if (wpa->detected_le == 1)
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{
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for (u32 nonce_error_correction = 0; nonce_error_correction <= nonce_error_corrections; nonce_error_correction++)
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{
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u32 t = to;
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t -= nonce_error_corrections / 2;
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t += nonce_error_correction;
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if (wpa->nonce_compare < 0)
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{
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pke[15] = (pke[15] & ~0x000000ff) | (t >> 24);
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pke[16] = (pke[16] & ~0xffffff00) | (t << 8);
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}
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else
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{
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pke[23] = (pke[23] & ~0x000000ff) | (t >> 24);
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pke[24] = (pke[24] & ~0xffffff00) | (t << 8);
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}
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u32 w0[4];
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u32 w1[4];
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u32 w2[4];
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u32 w3[4];
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w0[0] = out[0];
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w0[1] = out[1];
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w0[2] = out[2];
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w0[3] = out[3];
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w1[0] = out[4];
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w1[1] = out[5];
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w1[2] = out[6];
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w1[3] = out[7];
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w2[0] = 0;
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w2[1] = 0;
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w2[2] = 0;
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w2[3] = 0;
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w3[0] = 0;
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w3[1] = 0;
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w3[2] = 0;
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w3[3] = 0;
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u32 keymic[4];
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keymic[0] = 0;
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keymic[1] = 0;
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keymic[2] = 0;
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keymic[3] = 0;
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sha1_hmac_ctx_t ctx1;
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sha1_hmac_init_64 (&ctx1, w0, w1, w2, w3);
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ctx1.ipad.w0[0] = pke[ 0];
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ctx1.ipad.w0[1] = pke[ 1];
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ctx1.ipad.w0[2] = pke[ 2];
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ctx1.ipad.w0[3] = pke[ 3];
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ctx1.ipad.w1[0] = pke[ 4];
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ctx1.ipad.w1[1] = pke[ 5];
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ctx1.ipad.w1[2] = pke[ 6];
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ctx1.ipad.w1[3] = pke[ 7];
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ctx1.ipad.w2[0] = pke[ 8];
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ctx1.ipad.w2[1] = pke[ 9];
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ctx1.ipad.w2[2] = pke[10];
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ctx1.ipad.w2[3] = pke[11];
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ctx1.ipad.w3[0] = pke[12];
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ctx1.ipad.w3[1] = pke[13];
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ctx1.ipad.w3[2] = pke[14];
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ctx1.ipad.w3[3] = pke[15];
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sha1_transform (ctx1.ipad.w0, ctx1.ipad.w1, ctx1.ipad.w2, ctx1.ipad.w3, ctx1.ipad.h);
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ctx1.ipad.w0[0] = pke[16];
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ctx1.ipad.w0[1] = pke[17];
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ctx1.ipad.w0[2] = pke[18];
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ctx1.ipad.w0[3] = pke[19];
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ctx1.ipad.w1[0] = pke[20];
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ctx1.ipad.w1[1] = pke[21];
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ctx1.ipad.w1[2] = pke[22];
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ctx1.ipad.w1[3] = pke[23];
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ctx1.ipad.w2[0] = pke[24];
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ctx1.ipad.w2[1] = pke[25];
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ctx1.ipad.w2[2] = pke[26];
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ctx1.ipad.w2[3] = pke[27];
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ctx1.ipad.w3[0] = pke[28];
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ctx1.ipad.w3[1] = pke[29];
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ctx1.ipad.w3[2] = pke[30];
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ctx1.ipad.w3[3] = pke[31];
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ctx1.ipad.len += 100;
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sha1_hmac_final (&ctx1);
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u32 digest[4];
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digest[0] = ctx1.opad.h[0];
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digest[1] = ctx1.opad.h[1];
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digest[2] = ctx1.opad.h[2];
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digest[3] = ctx1.opad.h[3];
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u32 t0[4];
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u32 t1[4];
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u32 t2[4];
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u32 t3[4];
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t0[0] = swap32_S (digest[0]);
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t0[1] = swap32_S (digest[1]);
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t0[2] = swap32_S (digest[2]);
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t0[3] = swap32_S (digest[3]);
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t1[0] = 0;
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t1[1] = 0;
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t1[2] = 0;
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t1[3] = 0;
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t2[0] = 0;
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t2[1] = 0;
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t2[2] = 0;
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t2[3] = 0;
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t3[0] = 0;
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t3[1] = 0;
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t3[2] = 0;
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t3[3] = 0;
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md5_hmac_ctx_t ctx2;
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md5_hmac_init_64 (&ctx2, t0, t1, t2, t3);
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md5_hmac_update_global (&ctx2, wpa->eapol, wpa->eapol_len);
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md5_hmac_final (&ctx2);
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keymic[0] = ctx2.opad.h[0];
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keymic[1] = ctx2.opad.h[1];
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keymic[2] = ctx2.opad.h[2];
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keymic[3] = ctx2.opad.h[3];
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/**
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* final compare
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*/
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if ((keymic[0] == wpa->keymic[0])
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&& (keymic[1] == wpa->keymic[1])
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&& (keymic[2] == wpa->keymic[2])
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&& (keymic[3] == wpa->keymic[3]))
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{
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if (atomic_inc (&hashes_shown[digest_cur]) == 0)
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{
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mark_hash (plains_buf, d_return_buf, salt_pos, digests_cnt, digest_pos, digest_cur, gid, 0);
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}
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}
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}
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}
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if (wpa->detected_be == 1)
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{
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for (u32 nonce_error_correction = 0; nonce_error_correction <= nonce_error_corrections; nonce_error_correction++)
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{
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u32 t = to;
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@ -474,6 +628,7 @@ __kernel void m02500_aux1 (__global pw_t *pws, __global const kernel_rule_t *rul
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}
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}
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}
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}
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__kernel void m02500_aux2 (__global pw_t *pws, __global const kernel_rule_t *rules_buf, __global const pw_t *combs_buf, __global const bf_t *bfs_buf, __global wpa_tmp_t *tmps, __global void *hooks, __global const u32 *bitmaps_buf_s1_a, __global const u32 *bitmaps_buf_s1_b, __global const u32 *bitmaps_buf_s1_c, __global const u32 *bitmaps_buf_s1_d, __global const u32 *bitmaps_buf_s2_a, __global const u32 *bitmaps_buf_s2_b, __global const u32 *bitmaps_buf_s2_c, __global const u32 *bitmaps_buf_s2_d, __global plain_t *plains_buf, __global const digest_t *digests_buf, __global u32 *hashes_shown, __global const salt_t *salt_bufs, __global const wpa_t *wpa_bufs, __global u32 *d_return_buf, __global u32 *d_scryptV0_buf, __global u32 *d_scryptV1_buf, __global u32 *d_scryptV2_buf, __global u32 *d_scryptV3_buf, const u32 bitmap_mask, const u32 bitmap_shift1, const u32 bitmap_shift2, const u32 salt_pos, const u32 loop_pos, const u32 loop_cnt, const u32 il_cnt, const u32 digests_cnt, const u32 digests_offset, const u32 combs_mode, const u64 gid_max)
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{
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@ -549,6 +704,160 @@ __kernel void m02500_aux2 (__global pw_t *pws, __global const kernel_rule_t *rul
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const u32 nonce_error_corrections = wpa->nonce_error_corrections;
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if (wpa->detected_le == 1)
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{
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for (u32 nonce_error_correction = 0; nonce_error_correction <= nonce_error_corrections; nonce_error_correction++)
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{
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u32 t = to;
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t -= nonce_error_corrections / 2;
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t += nonce_error_correction;
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if (wpa->nonce_compare < 0)
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{
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pke[15] = (pke[15] & ~0x000000ff) | (t >> 24);
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pke[16] = (pke[16] & ~0xffffff00) | (t << 8);
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}
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else
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{
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pke[23] = (pke[23] & ~0x000000ff) | (t >> 24);
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pke[24] = (pke[24] & ~0xffffff00) | (t << 8);
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}
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u32 w0[4];
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u32 w1[4];
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u32 w2[4];
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u32 w3[4];
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w0[0] = out[0];
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w0[1] = out[1];
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w0[2] = out[2];
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w0[3] = out[3];
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w1[0] = out[4];
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w1[1] = out[5];
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w1[2] = out[6];
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w1[3] = out[7];
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w2[0] = 0;
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w2[1] = 0;
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w2[2] = 0;
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w2[3] = 0;
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w3[0] = 0;
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w3[1] = 0;
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w3[2] = 0;
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w3[3] = 0;
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u32 keymic[4];
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keymic[0] = 0;
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keymic[1] = 0;
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keymic[2] = 0;
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keymic[3] = 0;
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sha1_hmac_ctx_t ctx1;
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sha1_hmac_init_64 (&ctx1, w0, w1, w2, w3);
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ctx1.ipad.w0[0] = pke[ 0];
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ctx1.ipad.w0[1] = pke[ 1];
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ctx1.ipad.w0[2] = pke[ 2];
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ctx1.ipad.w0[3] = pke[ 3];
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ctx1.ipad.w1[0] = pke[ 4];
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ctx1.ipad.w1[1] = pke[ 5];
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ctx1.ipad.w1[2] = pke[ 6];
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ctx1.ipad.w1[3] = pke[ 7];
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ctx1.ipad.w2[0] = pke[ 8];
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ctx1.ipad.w2[1] = pke[ 9];
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ctx1.ipad.w2[2] = pke[10];
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ctx1.ipad.w2[3] = pke[11];
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ctx1.ipad.w3[0] = pke[12];
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ctx1.ipad.w3[1] = pke[13];
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ctx1.ipad.w3[2] = pke[14];
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ctx1.ipad.w3[3] = pke[15];
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sha1_transform (ctx1.ipad.w0, ctx1.ipad.w1, ctx1.ipad.w2, ctx1.ipad.w3, ctx1.ipad.h);
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ctx1.ipad.w0[0] = pke[16];
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ctx1.ipad.w0[1] = pke[17];
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ctx1.ipad.w0[2] = pke[18];
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ctx1.ipad.w0[3] = pke[19];
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ctx1.ipad.w1[0] = pke[20];
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ctx1.ipad.w1[1] = pke[21];
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ctx1.ipad.w1[2] = pke[22];
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ctx1.ipad.w1[3] = pke[23];
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ctx1.ipad.w2[0] = pke[24];
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ctx1.ipad.w2[1] = pke[25];
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ctx1.ipad.w2[2] = pke[26];
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ctx1.ipad.w2[3] = pke[27];
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ctx1.ipad.w3[0] = pke[28];
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ctx1.ipad.w3[1] = pke[29];
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ctx1.ipad.w3[2] = pke[30];
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ctx1.ipad.w3[3] = pke[31];
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ctx1.ipad.len += 100;
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sha1_hmac_final (&ctx1);
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u32 digest[4];
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digest[0] = ctx1.opad.h[0];
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digest[1] = ctx1.opad.h[1];
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digest[2] = ctx1.opad.h[2];
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digest[3] = ctx1.opad.h[3];
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u32 t0[4];
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u32 t1[4];
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u32 t2[4];
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u32 t3[4];
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t0[0] = digest[0];
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t0[1] = digest[1];
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t0[2] = digest[2];
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t0[3] = digest[3];
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t1[0] = 0;
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t1[1] = 0;
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t1[2] = 0;
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t1[3] = 0;
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t2[0] = 0;
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t2[1] = 0;
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t2[2] = 0;
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t2[3] = 0;
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t3[0] = 0;
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t3[1] = 0;
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t3[2] = 0;
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t3[3] = 0;
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sha1_hmac_ctx_t ctx2;
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sha1_hmac_init_64 (&ctx2, t0, t1, t2, t3);
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sha1_hmac_update_global (&ctx2, wpa->eapol, wpa->eapol_len);
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sha1_hmac_final (&ctx2);
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keymic[0] = ctx2.opad.h[0];
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keymic[1] = ctx2.opad.h[1];
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keymic[2] = ctx2.opad.h[2];
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keymic[3] = ctx2.opad.h[3];
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/**
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* final compare
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*/
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if ((keymic[0] == wpa->keymic[0])
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&& (keymic[1] == wpa->keymic[1])
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&& (keymic[2] == wpa->keymic[2])
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&& (keymic[3] == wpa->keymic[3]))
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{
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if (atomic_inc (&hashes_shown[digest_cur]) == 0)
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{
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mark_hash (plains_buf, d_return_buf, salt_pos, digests_cnt, digest_pos, digest_cur, gid, 0);
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}
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}
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}
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}
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if (wpa->detected_be == 1)
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{
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for (u32 nonce_error_correction = 0; nonce_error_correction <= nonce_error_corrections; nonce_error_correction++)
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{
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u32 t = to;
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@ -702,6 +1011,7 @@ __kernel void m02500_aux2 (__global pw_t *pws, __global const kernel_rule_t *rul
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}
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}
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}
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}
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__kernel void m02500_aux3 (__global pw_t *pws, __global const kernel_rule_t *rules_buf, __global const pw_t *combs_buf, __global const bf_t *bfs_buf, __global wpa_tmp_t *tmps, __global void *hooks, __global const u32 *bitmaps_buf_s1_a, __global const u32 *bitmaps_buf_s1_b, __global const u32 *bitmaps_buf_s1_c, __global const u32 *bitmaps_buf_s1_d, __global const u32 *bitmaps_buf_s2_a, __global const u32 *bitmaps_buf_s2_b, __global const u32 *bitmaps_buf_s2_c, __global const u32 *bitmaps_buf_s2_d, __global plain_t *plains_buf, __global const digest_t *digests_buf, __global u32 *hashes_shown, __global const salt_t *salt_bufs, __global const wpa_t *wpa_bufs, __global u32 *d_return_buf, __global u32 *d_scryptV0_buf, __global u32 *d_scryptV1_buf, __global u32 *d_scryptV2_buf, __global u32 *d_scryptV3_buf, const u32 bitmap_mask, const u32 bitmap_shift1, const u32 bitmap_shift2, const u32 salt_pos, const u32 loop_pos, const u32 loop_cnt, const u32 il_cnt, const u32 digests_cnt, const u32 digests_offset, const u32 combs_mode, const u64 gid_max)
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{
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@ -829,6 +1139,191 @@ __kernel void m02500_aux3 (__global pw_t *pws, __global const kernel_rule_t *rul
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const u32 nonce_error_corrections = wpa->nonce_error_corrections;
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if (wpa->detected_le == 1)
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{
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for (u32 nonce_error_correction = 0; nonce_error_correction <= nonce_error_corrections; nonce_error_correction++)
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{
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u32 t = to;
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t -= nonce_error_corrections / 2;
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t += nonce_error_correction;
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if (wpa->nonce_compare < 0)
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{
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pke[15] = (pke[15] & ~0x000000ff) | (t >> 24);
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pke[16] = (pke[16] & ~0xffffff00) | (t << 8);
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}
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else
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{
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pke[23] = (pke[23] & ~0x000000ff) | (t >> 24);
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pke[24] = (pke[24] & ~0xffffff00) | (t << 8);
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}
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u32 w0[4];
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u32 w1[4];
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u32 w2[4];
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u32 w3[4];
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w0[0] = out[0];
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w0[1] = out[1];
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w0[2] = out[2];
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w0[3] = out[3];
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w1[0] = out[4];
|
||||
w1[1] = out[5];
|
||||
w1[2] = out[6];
|
||||
w1[3] = out[7];
|
||||
w2[0] = 0;
|
||||
w2[1] = 0;
|
||||
w2[2] = 0;
|
||||
w2[3] = 0;
|
||||
w3[0] = 0;
|
||||
w3[1] = 0;
|
||||
w3[2] = 0;
|
||||
w3[3] = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
u32 keymic[4];
|
||||
|
||||
keymic[0] = 0;
|
||||
keymic[1] = 0;
|
||||
keymic[2] = 0;
|
||||
keymic[3] = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
sha256_hmac_ctx_t ctx1;
|
||||
|
||||
sha256_hmac_init_64 (&ctx1, w0, w1, w2, w3);
|
||||
|
||||
ctx1.ipad.w0[0] = pke[ 0];
|
||||
ctx1.ipad.w0[1] = pke[ 1];
|
||||
ctx1.ipad.w0[2] = pke[ 2];
|
||||
ctx1.ipad.w0[3] = pke[ 3];
|
||||
ctx1.ipad.w1[0] = pke[ 4];
|
||||
ctx1.ipad.w1[1] = pke[ 5];
|
||||
ctx1.ipad.w1[2] = pke[ 6];
|
||||
ctx1.ipad.w1[3] = pke[ 7];
|
||||
ctx1.ipad.w2[0] = pke[ 8];
|
||||
ctx1.ipad.w2[1] = pke[ 9];
|
||||
ctx1.ipad.w2[2] = pke[10];
|
||||
ctx1.ipad.w2[3] = pke[11];
|
||||
ctx1.ipad.w3[0] = pke[12];
|
||||
ctx1.ipad.w3[1] = pke[13];
|
||||
ctx1.ipad.w3[2] = pke[14];
|
||||
ctx1.ipad.w3[3] = pke[15];
|
||||
|
||||
sha256_transform (ctx1.ipad.w0, ctx1.ipad.w1, ctx1.ipad.w2, ctx1.ipad.w3, ctx1.ipad.h);
|
||||
|
||||
ctx1.ipad.w0[0] = pke[16];
|
||||
ctx1.ipad.w0[1] = pke[17];
|
||||
ctx1.ipad.w0[2] = pke[18];
|
||||
ctx1.ipad.w0[3] = pke[19];
|
||||
ctx1.ipad.w1[0] = pke[20];
|
||||
ctx1.ipad.w1[1] = pke[21];
|
||||
ctx1.ipad.w1[2] = pke[22];
|
||||
ctx1.ipad.w1[3] = pke[23];
|
||||
ctx1.ipad.w2[0] = pke[24];
|
||||
ctx1.ipad.w2[1] = pke[25];
|
||||
ctx1.ipad.w2[2] = pke[26];
|
||||
ctx1.ipad.w2[3] = pke[27];
|
||||
ctx1.ipad.w3[0] = pke[28];
|
||||
ctx1.ipad.w3[1] = pke[29];
|
||||
ctx1.ipad.w3[2] = pke[30];
|
||||
ctx1.ipad.w3[3] = pke[31];
|
||||
|
||||
ctx1.ipad.len += 102;
|
||||
|
||||
sha256_hmac_final (&ctx1);
|
||||
|
||||
u32 digest[4];
|
||||
|
||||
digest[0] = swap32_S (ctx1.opad.h[0]);
|
||||
digest[1] = swap32_S (ctx1.opad.h[1]);
|
||||
digest[2] = swap32_S (ctx1.opad.h[2]);
|
||||
digest[3] = swap32_S (ctx1.opad.h[3]);
|
||||
|
||||
// AES CMAC
|
||||
|
||||
u32 ks[44];
|
||||
|
||||
aes128_set_encrypt_key (ks, digest, s_te0, s_te1, s_te2, s_te3, s_te4);
|
||||
|
||||
u32 m[4];
|
||||
|
||||
m[0] = 0;
|
||||
m[1] = 0;
|
||||
m[2] = 0;
|
||||
m[3] = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
u32 iv[4];
|
||||
|
||||
iv[0] = 0;
|
||||
iv[1] = 0;
|
||||
iv[2] = 0;
|
||||
iv[3] = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
int eapol_left;
|
||||
int eapol_idx;
|
||||
|
||||
for (eapol_left = wpa->eapol_len, eapol_idx = 0; eapol_left > 16; eapol_left -= 16, eapol_idx += 4)
|
||||
{
|
||||
m[0] = wpa->eapol[eapol_idx + 0] ^ iv[0];
|
||||
m[1] = wpa->eapol[eapol_idx + 1] ^ iv[1];
|
||||
m[2] = wpa->eapol[eapol_idx + 2] ^ iv[2];
|
||||
m[3] = wpa->eapol[eapol_idx + 3] ^ iv[3];
|
||||
|
||||
aes128_encrypt (ks, m, iv, s_te0, s_te1, s_te2, s_te3, s_te4);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
m[0] = wpa->eapol[eapol_idx + 0];
|
||||
m[1] = wpa->eapol[eapol_idx + 1];
|
||||
m[2] = wpa->eapol[eapol_idx + 2];
|
||||
m[3] = wpa->eapol[eapol_idx + 3];
|
||||
|
||||
u32 k[4];
|
||||
|
||||
k[0] = 0;
|
||||
k[1] = 0;
|
||||
k[2] = 0;
|
||||
k[3] = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
aes128_encrypt (ks, k, k, s_te0, s_te1, s_te2, s_te3, s_te4);
|
||||
|
||||
make_kn (k);
|
||||
|
||||
if (eapol_left < 16)
|
||||
{
|
||||
make_kn (k);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
m[0] ^= k[0];
|
||||
m[1] ^= k[1];
|
||||
m[2] ^= k[2];
|
||||
m[3] ^= k[3];
|
||||
|
||||
m[0] ^= iv[0];
|
||||
m[1] ^= iv[1];
|
||||
m[2] ^= iv[2];
|
||||
m[3] ^= iv[3];
|
||||
|
||||
aes128_encrypt (ks, m, keymic, s_te0, s_te1, s_te2, s_te3, s_te4);
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* final compare
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
if ((keymic[0] == wpa->keymic[0])
|
||||
&& (keymic[1] == wpa->keymic[1])
|
||||
&& (keymic[2] == wpa->keymic[2])
|
||||
&& (keymic[3] == wpa->keymic[3]))
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (atomic_inc (&hashes_shown[digest_cur]) == 0)
|
||||
{
|
||||
mark_hash (plains_buf, d_return_buf, salt_pos, digests_cnt, digest_pos, digest_cur, gid, 0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (wpa->detected_be == 1)
|
||||
{
|
||||
for (u32 nonce_error_correction = 0; nonce_error_correction <= nonce_error_corrections; nonce_error_correction++)
|
||||
{
|
||||
u32 t = to;
|
||||
@ -1013,3 +1508,4 @@ __kernel void m02500_aux3 (__global pw_t *pws, __global const kernel_rule_t *rul
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
388
OpenCL/m02501.cl
388
OpenCL/m02501.cl
@ -196,6 +196,124 @@ __kernel void m02501_aux1 (__global pw_t *pws, __global const kernel_rule_t *rul
|
||||
|
||||
const u32 nonce_error_corrections = wpa->nonce_error_corrections;
|
||||
|
||||
if (wpa->detected_le == 1)
|
||||
{
|
||||
for (u32 nonce_error_correction = 0; nonce_error_correction <= nonce_error_corrections; nonce_error_correction++)
|
||||
{
|
||||
u32 t = to;
|
||||
|
||||
t -= nonce_error_corrections / 2;
|
||||
t += nonce_error_correction;
|
||||
|
||||
if (wpa->nonce_compare < 0)
|
||||
{
|
||||
pke[15] = (pke[15] & ~0x000000ff) | (t >> 24);
|
||||
pke[16] = (pke[16] & ~0xffffff00) | (t << 8);
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
{
|
||||
pke[23] = (pke[23] & ~0x000000ff) | (t >> 24);
|
||||
pke[24] = (pke[24] & ~0xffffff00) | (t << 8);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
u32 w0[4];
|
||||
u32 w1[4];
|
||||
u32 w2[4];
|
||||
u32 w3[4];
|
||||
|
||||
w0[0] = out[0];
|
||||
w0[1] = out[1];
|
||||
w0[2] = out[2];
|
||||
w0[3] = out[3];
|
||||
w1[0] = out[4];
|
||||
w1[1] = out[5];
|
||||
w1[2] = out[6];
|
||||
w1[3] = out[7];
|
||||
w2[0] = 0;
|
||||
w2[1] = 0;
|
||||
w2[2] = 0;
|
||||
w2[3] = 0;
|
||||
w3[0] = 0;
|
||||
w3[1] = 0;
|
||||
w3[2] = 0;
|
||||
w3[3] = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
u32 keymic[4];
|
||||
|
||||
keymic[0] = 0;
|
||||
keymic[1] = 0;
|
||||
keymic[2] = 0;
|
||||
keymic[3] = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
sha1_hmac_ctx_t ctx1;
|
||||
|
||||
sha1_hmac_init_64 (&ctx1, w0, w1, w2, w3);
|
||||
|
||||
sha1_hmac_update (&ctx1, pke, 100);
|
||||
|
||||
sha1_hmac_final (&ctx1);
|
||||
|
||||
u32 digest[4];
|
||||
|
||||
digest[0] = ctx1.opad.h[0];
|
||||
digest[1] = ctx1.opad.h[1];
|
||||
digest[2] = ctx1.opad.h[2];
|
||||
digest[3] = ctx1.opad.h[3];
|
||||
|
||||
u32 t0[4];
|
||||
u32 t1[4];
|
||||
u32 t2[4];
|
||||
u32 t3[4];
|
||||
|
||||
t0[0] = swap32_S (digest[0]);
|
||||
t0[1] = swap32_S (digest[1]);
|
||||
t0[2] = swap32_S (digest[2]);
|
||||
t0[3] = swap32_S (digest[3]);
|
||||
t1[0] = 0;
|
||||
t1[1] = 0;
|
||||
t1[2] = 0;
|
||||
t1[3] = 0;
|
||||
t2[0] = 0;
|
||||
t2[1] = 0;
|
||||
t2[2] = 0;
|
||||
t2[3] = 0;
|
||||
t3[0] = 0;
|
||||
t3[1] = 0;
|
||||
t3[2] = 0;
|
||||
t3[3] = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
md5_hmac_ctx_t ctx2;
|
||||
|
||||
md5_hmac_init_64 (&ctx2, t0, t1, t2, t3);
|
||||
|
||||
md5_hmac_update_global (&ctx2, wpa->eapol, wpa->eapol_len);
|
||||
|
||||
md5_hmac_final (&ctx2);
|
||||
|
||||
keymic[0] = ctx2.opad.h[0];
|
||||
keymic[1] = ctx2.opad.h[1];
|
||||
keymic[2] = ctx2.opad.h[2];
|
||||
keymic[3] = ctx2.opad.h[3];
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* final compare
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
if ((keymic[0] == wpa->keymic[0])
|
||||
&& (keymic[1] == wpa->keymic[1])
|
||||
&& (keymic[2] == wpa->keymic[2])
|
||||
&& (keymic[3] == wpa->keymic[3]))
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (atomic_inc (&hashes_shown[digest_cur]) == 0)
|
||||
{
|
||||
mark_hash (plains_buf, d_return_buf, salt_pos, digests_cnt, digest_pos, digest_cur, gid, 0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (wpa->detected_be == 1)
|
||||
{
|
||||
for (u32 nonce_error_correction = 0; nonce_error_correction <= nonce_error_corrections; nonce_error_correction++)
|
||||
{
|
||||
u32 t = to;
|
||||
@ -313,6 +431,7 @@ __kernel void m02501_aux1 (__global pw_t *pws, __global const kernel_rule_t *rul
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
__kernel void m02501_aux2 (__global pw_t *pws, __global const kernel_rule_t *rules_buf, __global const pw_t *combs_buf, __global const bf_t *bfs_buf, __global wpapmk_tmp_t *tmps, __global void *hooks, __global const u32 *bitmaps_buf_s1_a, __global const u32 *bitmaps_buf_s1_b, __global const u32 *bitmaps_buf_s1_c, __global const u32 *bitmaps_buf_s1_d, __global const u32 *bitmaps_buf_s2_a, __global const u32 *bitmaps_buf_s2_b, __global const u32 *bitmaps_buf_s2_c, __global const u32 *bitmaps_buf_s2_d, __global plain_t *plains_buf, __global const digest_t *digests_buf, __global u32 *hashes_shown, __global const salt_t *salt_bufs, __global const wpa_t *wpa_bufs, __global u32 *d_return_buf, __global u32 *d_scryptV0_buf, __global u32 *d_scryptV1_buf, __global u32 *d_scryptV2_buf, __global u32 *d_scryptV3_buf, const u32 bitmap_mask, const u32 bitmap_shift1, const u32 bitmap_shift2, const u32 salt_pos, const u32 loop_pos, const u32 loop_cnt, const u32 il_cnt, const u32 digests_cnt, const u32 digests_offset, const u32 combs_mode, const u64 gid_max)
|
||||
{
|
||||
@ -388,6 +507,124 @@ __kernel void m02501_aux2 (__global pw_t *pws, __global const kernel_rule_t *rul
|
||||
|
||||
const u32 nonce_error_corrections = wpa->nonce_error_corrections;
|
||||
|
||||
if (wpa->detected_le == 1)
|
||||
{
|
||||
for (u32 nonce_error_correction = 0; nonce_error_correction <= nonce_error_corrections; nonce_error_correction++)
|
||||
{
|
||||
u32 t = to;
|
||||
|
||||
t -= nonce_error_corrections / 2;
|
||||
t += nonce_error_correction;
|
||||
|
||||
if (wpa->nonce_compare < 0)
|
||||
{
|
||||
pke[15] = (pke[15] & ~0x000000ff) | (t >> 24);
|
||||
pke[16] = (pke[16] & ~0xffffff00) | (t << 8);
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
{
|
||||
pke[23] = (pke[23] & ~0x000000ff) | (t >> 24);
|
||||
pke[24] = (pke[24] & ~0xffffff00) | (t << 8);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
u32 w0[4];
|
||||
u32 w1[4];
|
||||
u32 w2[4];
|
||||
u32 w3[4];
|
||||
|
||||
w0[0] = out[0];
|
||||
w0[1] = out[1];
|
||||
w0[2] = out[2];
|
||||
w0[3] = out[3];
|
||||
w1[0] = out[4];
|
||||
w1[1] = out[5];
|
||||
w1[2] = out[6];
|
||||
w1[3] = out[7];
|
||||
w2[0] = 0;
|
||||
w2[1] = 0;
|
||||
w2[2] = 0;
|
||||
w2[3] = 0;
|
||||
w3[0] = 0;
|
||||
w3[1] = 0;
|
||||
w3[2] = 0;
|
||||
w3[3] = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
u32 keymic[4];
|
||||
|
||||
keymic[0] = 0;
|
||||
keymic[1] = 0;
|
||||
keymic[2] = 0;
|
||||
keymic[3] = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
sha1_hmac_ctx_t ctx1;
|
||||
|
||||
sha1_hmac_init_64 (&ctx1, w0, w1, w2, w3);
|
||||
|
||||
sha1_hmac_update (&ctx1, pke, 100);
|
||||
|
||||
sha1_hmac_final (&ctx1);
|
||||
|
||||
u32 digest[4];
|
||||
|
||||
digest[0] = ctx1.opad.h[0];
|
||||
digest[1] = ctx1.opad.h[1];
|
||||
digest[2] = ctx1.opad.h[2];
|
||||
digest[3] = ctx1.opad.h[3];
|
||||
|
||||
u32 t0[4];
|
||||
u32 t1[4];
|
||||
u32 t2[4];
|
||||
u32 t3[4];
|
||||
|
||||
t0[0] = digest[0];
|
||||
t0[1] = digest[1];
|
||||
t0[2] = digest[2];
|
||||
t0[3] = digest[3];
|
||||
t1[0] = 0;
|
||||
t1[1] = 0;
|
||||
t1[2] = 0;
|
||||
t1[3] = 0;
|
||||
t2[0] = 0;
|
||||
t2[1] = 0;
|
||||
t2[2] = 0;
|
||||
t2[3] = 0;
|
||||
t3[0] = 0;
|
||||
t3[1] = 0;
|
||||
t3[2] = 0;
|
||||
t3[3] = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
sha1_hmac_ctx_t ctx2;
|
||||
|
||||
sha1_hmac_init_64 (&ctx2, t0, t1, t2, t3);
|
||||
|
||||
sha1_hmac_update_global (&ctx2, wpa->eapol, wpa->eapol_len);
|
||||
|
||||
sha1_hmac_final (&ctx2);
|
||||
|
||||
keymic[0] = ctx2.opad.h[0];
|
||||
keymic[1] = ctx2.opad.h[1];
|
||||
keymic[2] = ctx2.opad.h[2];
|
||||
keymic[3] = ctx2.opad.h[3];
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* final compare
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
if ((keymic[0] == wpa->keymic[0])
|
||||
&& (keymic[1] == wpa->keymic[1])
|
||||
&& (keymic[2] == wpa->keymic[2])
|
||||
&& (keymic[3] == wpa->keymic[3]))
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (atomic_inc (&hashes_shown[digest_cur]) == 0)
|
||||
{
|
||||
mark_hash (plains_buf, d_return_buf, salt_pos, digests_cnt, digest_pos, digest_cur, gid, 0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (wpa->detected_be == 1)
|
||||
{
|
||||
for (u32 nonce_error_correction = 0; nonce_error_correction <= nonce_error_corrections; nonce_error_correction++)
|
||||
{
|
||||
u32 t = to;
|
||||
@ -505,6 +742,7 @@ __kernel void m02501_aux2 (__global pw_t *pws, __global const kernel_rule_t *rul
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
__kernel void m02501_aux3 (__global pw_t *pws, __global const kernel_rule_t *rules_buf, __global const pw_t *combs_buf, __global const bf_t *bfs_buf, __global wpapmk_tmp_t *tmps, __global void *hooks, __global const u32 *bitmaps_buf_s1_a, __global const u32 *bitmaps_buf_s1_b, __global const u32 *bitmaps_buf_s1_c, __global const u32 *bitmaps_buf_s1_d, __global const u32 *bitmaps_buf_s2_a, __global const u32 *bitmaps_buf_s2_b, __global const u32 *bitmaps_buf_s2_c, __global const u32 *bitmaps_buf_s2_d, __global plain_t *plains_buf, __global const digest_t *digests_buf, __global u32 *hashes_shown, __global const salt_t *salt_bufs, __global const wpa_t *wpa_bufs, __global u32 *d_return_buf, __global u32 *d_scryptV0_buf, __global u32 *d_scryptV1_buf, __global u32 *d_scryptV2_buf, __global u32 *d_scryptV3_buf, const u32 bitmap_mask, const u32 bitmap_shift1, const u32 bitmap_shift2, const u32 salt_pos, const u32 loop_pos, const u32 loop_cnt, const u32 il_cnt, const u32 digests_cnt, const u32 digests_offset, const u32 combs_mode, const u64 gid_max)
|
||||
{
|
||||
@ -632,6 +870,155 @@ __kernel void m02501_aux3 (__global pw_t *pws, __global const kernel_rule_t *rul
|
||||
|
||||
const u32 nonce_error_corrections = wpa->nonce_error_corrections;
|
||||
|
||||
if (wpa->detected_le == 1)
|
||||
{
|
||||
for (u32 nonce_error_correction = 0; nonce_error_correction <= nonce_error_corrections; nonce_error_correction++)
|
||||
{
|
||||
u32 t = to;
|
||||
|
||||
t -= nonce_error_corrections / 2;
|
||||
t += nonce_error_correction;
|
||||
|
||||
if (wpa->nonce_compare < 0)
|
||||
{
|
||||
pke[15] = (pke[15] & ~0x000000ff) | (t >> 24);
|
||||
pke[16] = (pke[16] & ~0xffffff00) | (t << 8);
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
{
|
||||
pke[23] = (pke[23] & ~0x000000ff) | (t >> 24);
|
||||
pke[24] = (pke[24] & ~0xffffff00) | (t << 8);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
u32 w0[4];
|
||||
u32 w1[4];
|
||||
u32 w2[4];
|
||||
u32 w3[4];
|
||||
|
||||
w0[0] = out[0];
|
||||
w0[1] = out[1];
|
||||
w0[2] = out[2];
|
||||
w0[3] = out[3];
|
||||
w1[0] = out[4];
|
||||
w1[1] = out[5];
|
||||
w1[2] = out[6];
|
||||
w1[3] = out[7];
|
||||
w2[0] = 0;
|
||||
w2[1] = 0;
|
||||
w2[2] = 0;
|
||||
w2[3] = 0;
|
||||
w3[0] = 0;
|
||||
w3[1] = 0;
|
||||
w3[2] = 0;
|
||||
w3[3] = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
u32 keymic[4];
|
||||
|
||||
keymic[0] = 0;
|
||||
keymic[1] = 0;
|
||||
keymic[2] = 0;
|
||||
keymic[3] = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
sha256_hmac_ctx_t ctx1;
|
||||
|
||||
sha256_hmac_init_64 (&ctx1, w0, w1, w2, w3);
|
||||
|
||||
sha256_hmac_update (&ctx1, pke, 102);
|
||||
|
||||
sha256_hmac_final (&ctx1);
|
||||
|
||||
u32 digest[4];
|
||||
|
||||
digest[0] = swap32_S (ctx1.opad.h[0]);
|
||||
digest[1] = swap32_S (ctx1.opad.h[1]);
|
||||
digest[2] = swap32_S (ctx1.opad.h[2]);
|
||||
digest[3] = swap32_S (ctx1.opad.h[3]);
|
||||
|
||||
// AES CMAC
|
||||
|
||||
u32 ks[44];
|
||||
|
||||
aes128_set_encrypt_key (ks, digest, s_te0, s_te1, s_te2, s_te3, s_te4);
|
||||
|
||||
u32 m[4];
|
||||
|
||||
m[0] = 0;
|
||||
m[1] = 0;
|
||||
m[2] = 0;
|
||||
m[3] = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
u32 iv[4];
|
||||
|
||||
iv[0] = 0;
|
||||
iv[1] = 0;
|
||||
iv[2] = 0;
|
||||
iv[3] = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
int eapol_left;
|
||||
int eapol_idx;
|
||||
|
||||
for (eapol_left = wpa->eapol_len, eapol_idx = 0; eapol_left > 16; eapol_left -= 16, eapol_idx += 4)
|
||||
{
|
||||
m[0] = wpa->eapol[eapol_idx + 0] ^ iv[0];
|
||||
m[1] = wpa->eapol[eapol_idx + 1] ^ iv[1];
|
||||
m[2] = wpa->eapol[eapol_idx + 2] ^ iv[2];
|
||||
m[3] = wpa->eapol[eapol_idx + 3] ^ iv[3];
|
||||
|
||||
aes128_encrypt (ks, m, iv, s_te0, s_te1, s_te2, s_te3, s_te4);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
m[0] = wpa->eapol[eapol_idx + 0];
|
||||
m[1] = wpa->eapol[eapol_idx + 1];
|
||||
m[2] = wpa->eapol[eapol_idx + 2];
|
||||
m[3] = wpa->eapol[eapol_idx + 3];
|
||||
|
||||
u32 k[4];
|
||||
|
||||
k[0] = 0;
|
||||
k[1] = 0;
|
||||
k[2] = 0;
|
||||
k[3] = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
aes128_encrypt (ks, k, k, s_te0, s_te1, s_te2, s_te3, s_te4);
|
||||
|
||||
make_kn (k);
|
||||
|
||||
if (eapol_left < 16)
|
||||
{
|
||||
make_kn (k);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
m[0] ^= k[0];
|
||||
m[1] ^= k[1];
|
||||
m[2] ^= k[2];
|
||||
m[3] ^= k[3];
|
||||
|
||||
m[0] ^= iv[0];
|
||||
m[1] ^= iv[1];
|
||||
m[2] ^= iv[2];
|
||||
m[3] ^= iv[3];
|
||||
|
||||
aes128_encrypt (ks, m, keymic, s_te0, s_te1, s_te2, s_te3, s_te4);
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* final compare
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
if ((keymic[0] == wpa->keymic[0])
|
||||
&& (keymic[1] == wpa->keymic[1])
|
||||
&& (keymic[2] == wpa->keymic[2])
|
||||
&& (keymic[3] == wpa->keymic[3]))
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (atomic_inc (&hashes_shown[digest_cur]) == 0)
|
||||
{
|
||||
mark_hash (plains_buf, d_return_buf, salt_pos, digests_cnt, digest_pos, digest_cur, gid, 0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (wpa->detected_be == 1)
|
||||
{
|
||||
for (u32 nonce_error_correction = 0; nonce_error_correction <= nonce_error_corrections; nonce_error_correction++)
|
||||
{
|
||||
u32 t = to;
|
||||
@ -780,3 +1167,4 @@ __kernel void m02501_aux3 (__global pw_t *pws, __global const kernel_rule_t *rul
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
|
||||
## Improvements
|
||||
##
|
||||
|
||||
- HCCAPX management: Use advanced hints in message_pair stored by hcxtools about endian bitness of replay counter
|
||||
- OpenCL kernels: Abort session if kernel self-test failed
|
||||
- Added JtR-compatible support for hex notation in rules engine
|
||||
|
||||
@ -12,6 +13,7 @@
|
||||
##
|
||||
|
||||
- Fixed a missing kernel in -m 5600 in combination with -a 3 and -O if mask is >= 16 characters
|
||||
- Fixed missing code section in -m 2500 and -m 2501 to crack corrupted handshakes with a LE endian bitness base
|
||||
|
||||
* changes v4.0.1 -> v4.1.0
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -194,6 +194,8 @@ typedef struct wpa
|
||||
u32 hash[4];
|
||||
int nonce_compare;
|
||||
int nonce_error_corrections;
|
||||
int detected_le;
|
||||
int detected_be;
|
||||
|
||||
} wpa_t;
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1581,6 +1581,7 @@ typedef struct user_options
|
||||
bool workload_profile_chgd;
|
||||
bool segment_size_chgd;
|
||||
bool hccapx_message_pair_chgd;
|
||||
bool nonce_error_corrections_chgd;
|
||||
|
||||
bool advice_disable;
|
||||
bool benchmark;
|
||||
|
||||
50
src/hashes.c
50
src/hashes.c
@ -831,8 +831,55 @@ int hashes_init_stage1 (hashcat_ctx_t *hashcat_ctx)
|
||||
wpa->message_pair = (u8) user_options->hccapx_message_pair;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (wpa->message_pair & (1 << 4))
|
||||
{
|
||||
// ap-less attack detected, nc not needed
|
||||
|
||||
wpa->nonce_error_corrections = 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (wpa->message_pair & (1 << 7))
|
||||
{
|
||||
// replaycount not checked, nc needed
|
||||
|
||||
wpa->nonce_error_corrections = user_options->nonce_error_corrections;
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
{
|
||||
// replaycount checked, nc not needed, but we allow user overwrites
|
||||
|
||||
if (user_options->nonce_error_corrections_chgd == true)
|
||||
{
|
||||
wpa->nonce_error_corrections = user_options->nonce_error_corrections;
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
{
|
||||
wpa->nonce_error_corrections = 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// now some optimization related to replay counter endianess
|
||||
// hcxtools has techniques to detect them
|
||||
// since we can not guarantee to get our handshakes from hcxtools we enable both by default
|
||||
// this means that we check both even if both are not set!
|
||||
// however if one of them is set, we can assume that the endianess has been checked and the other one is not needed
|
||||
|
||||
wpa->detected_le = 1;
|
||||
wpa->detected_be = 1;
|
||||
|
||||
if (wpa->message_pair & (1 << 5))
|
||||
{
|
||||
wpa->detected_le = 1;
|
||||
wpa->detected_be = 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
else if (wpa->message_pair & (1 << 6))
|
||||
{
|
||||
wpa->detected_le = 0;
|
||||
wpa->detected_be = 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (hashconfig->hook_salt_size > 0)
|
||||
@ -1652,6 +1699,9 @@ int hashes_init_selftest (hashcat_ctx_t *hashcat_ctx)
|
||||
|
||||
wpa_t *wpa = (wpa_t *) st_esalts_buf;
|
||||
|
||||
wpa->detected_le = 1;
|
||||
wpa->detected_be = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
wpa->nonce_error_corrections = 3;
|
||||
}
|
||||
else if (hashconfig->opts_type & OPTS_TYPE_BINARY_HASHFILE)
|
||||
|
||||
@ -396,7 +396,8 @@ int user_options_getopt (hashcat_ctx_t *hashcat_ctx, int argc, char **argv)
|
||||
case IDX_LOGFILE_DISABLE: user_options->logfile_disable = true; break;
|
||||
case IDX_HCCAPX_MESSAGE_PAIR: user_options->hccapx_message_pair = hc_strtoul (optarg, NULL, 10);
|
||||
user_options->hccapx_message_pair_chgd = true; break;
|
||||
case IDX_NONCE_ERROR_CORRECTIONS: user_options->nonce_error_corrections = hc_strtoul (optarg, NULL, 10); break;
|
||||
case IDX_NONCE_ERROR_CORRECTIONS: user_options->nonce_error_corrections = hc_strtoul (optarg, NULL, 10);
|
||||
user_options->nonce_error_corrections_chgd = true; break;
|
||||
case IDX_TRUECRYPT_KEYFILES: user_options->truecrypt_keyfiles = optarg; break;
|
||||
case IDX_VERACRYPT_KEYFILES: user_options->veracrypt_keyfiles = optarg; break;
|
||||
case IDX_VERACRYPT_PIM: user_options->veracrypt_pim = hc_strtoul (optarg, NULL, 10); break;
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
x
Reference in New Issue
Block a user